ObjectStackObjectStack

System context (isSystem) — bypass rules

Every platform behaviour that ExecutionContext.isSystem changes — what an elevated write gets, what it loses, and what the flag deliberately does not do.

ExecutionContext.isSystem is the platform's one elevation flag. Setting it on a write or read means "this operation is the engine acting on its own behalf" — the seed loader replaying package fixtures, a plugin's boot reconciler, a service self-write, a migration.

This page is the authority for what that flag actually does. It exists because the flag is not one concept: it is a single boolean read at over a hundred distinct sites across some twenty packages, and knowing three of those behaviours gives no hint that the rest exist. Every documented app-side bug traced to isSystem had the same shape — the metadata was complete and correct, and the gap was observable only by querying the resulting rows.

Elevation is total, and it is not granular. isSystem is not "skip the permission check". It short-circuits authorization, ownership stamping, read-only protection, referential-integrity checks, sharing materialisation, approval locks and provenance stamping — in twenty packages that do not know about each other. Read the table before you set it; prefer a scoped user context whenever one exists.

Every row, and the population behind it, is checked by CI. scripts/check-system-context-census.mjs re-runs the AST census over the whole repo on each PR and refuses the page when the code holds an elevation read that no row here names — the check that matters most — when a row names a symbol that holds no read any more, or when the generated site register differs from what the tree produces. The page states no totals: run node scripts/isystem-census.mjs for a live count. The six raw text counts in Maintaining this table are a dated snapshot, and say there when they were measured.

⚠️ What the rows say, and what is generated — read this before trusting a row. A row names the symbols its behaviour lives in, by name, in its Symbol column; which file holds each one is the site register's to say, and the register is rebuilt from the tree. So a refactor that moves a symbol to another file changes the register and no row. The row itself is a human's claim: several reads inside one function share one name, so adding or deleting one of them moves only that symbol's read count in the register — CI reds until the register is regenerated, and whether the row still describes the symbol is the reviewer's call. See Maintaining this table.

Which isSystem this page is about

Three unrelated declarations share the identifier. This page documents only the first. The others are metadata keys on a stored document (one of them now retired) and have nothing to do with elevation. (A fourth, Environment.isSystem — a platform-infrastructure environment, not user data — left this repo with the @objectstack/spec/cloud subpath in #16325 and is declared in the cloud repo.)

DeclarationWhat it isThis page?
ExecutionContext.isSystem — packages/spec/src/kernel/execution-context.zod.ts#isSystemThe elevation flag on an operation's context✅
Object.isSystem — packages/spec/src/data/object.zod.ts#isSystemMarks a system object (protected from deletion; defaults its org-wide sharing to public when no sharingModel is set)❌
EmailTemplate.isSystem — packages/spec/src/system/email-template.zod.ts#isSystemA retired key: a retiredKey() tombstone, which the parse refuses with a migration note❌

The collision is a genuine hazard rather than a naming nit: Object.isSystem changes an object's default sharing, and ExecutionContext.isSystem changes whether sharing grants are materialised — so a search for "isSystem sharing" returns both, and they are unrelated decisions.

A fifth, closely-spelled family — isSystemObjectName() / isSystemObject() in packages/runtime/src/action-execution.ts#isSystemObjectName, packages/mcp/src/mcp-http-tools.ts#isSystemObject — keys on the sys_ name prefix, not on any flag.

How the flag is set

isSystem is server-constructed and never client-supplied. Inbound HTTP cannot set it (packages/rest/src/rest-server.ts#enforceAuth), and neither can an action body (packages/runtime/src/domains/actions.ts#handleActionsRequest). It is written by internal callers only, as an option on the engine call:

await engine.insert('crm_account', row, { context: { isSystem: true } });

Its parse-time default is false (packages/spec/src/kernel/execution-context.zod.ts#isSystem), so an absent context is never elevated.


The table

Grouped by lane. Every row names, in its Symbol column, the symbols whose reads it describes; the site register at the foot of the page gives each one's file. A name two files share is written as a full path#symbol anchor instead. "What you lose" is the part that costs app-side bugs — it is the protection or the side effect that silently does not happen.

1. Authorization and scoping

#Behaviour when isSystemPackageWhat you get / what you loseSymbol
1The whole security middleware short-circuits before any gate runsplugin-securityGet: every CRUD/FLS/tenant/owner gate below skipped in one branch. Lose: every gate under it in this lane at once, down to and including the write-bypass row that widens the effective write scope to org (row 7) — this is the single largest behaviour on the pageregisterAuthzMiddleware
1bApp-authored automation's system context is REFUSED governed writes to the identity-assignment objects — a flow run's, an app-authored hook's (runAs: 'system', a system context it inherits, its sudo()) and an action body's; checked ahead of the middleware's short-circuit, beside the append-only refusal (assertAppAutomationAppendOnlyWriteAllowed)plugin-securityGet: nothing — an insert, update, delete, transfer, restore or purge of sys_user_position, sys_user_permission_set, sys_invitation or sys_member from a context carrying isSystem and either a flowRunId (a runAs: 'system' flow's data nodes) or the app-automation elevation mark (@objectstack/core; set only by a hook's runAs: 'system' derivation, by the action body's execution-context builder and ObjectRepository.execute, and on the api of a hook bound through the hook binder, whose inherited system context and sudo() it marks), at any depth of their writes, is refused PERMISSION_DENIED before the short-circuit skips the ADR-0090 D12 gate and the identity write guard. The platform's own system api (platformSystemApi, objectql) takes the mark and flowRunId off a platform hook's api, for the audit writer's own ledger rows. On an app-authored hook's api, on the api an action door hands its handler (a host code action handler's included) and on the api ObjectRepository.execute hands the action it dispatches (ctx.api.object(o).execute(name)), and on every api derived from any of them, it answers what that api's sudo() answers, mark kept, so this refusal, and the action body's owner stamp in the next row, hold through it too. Lose: nothing a platform writer held — a system context with neither (the seeders, better-auth and its reconciliation, invitation placement, platform code's sudo(), which never sets the mark, and a hook registered in code) passes on to the short-circuit unchanged, reads are not judged, and a runAs: 'user' flow or hook carries no isSystem, so the D12 gate judges it as the user it acts forelevationSource, appAuthoredHookApi
2owner_id is not auto-stamped on INSERT (the step 3.5 anchor guard is inside the block row 1 skips) — except an action body's insertplugin-securityLose: the row lands owner_id = NULL, so the default owner_only_writes policy hides it from its own creator. Get: nothing — this is a gap, not a capability. Except an action body's: an insert from a context carrying isSystem and the 'action' app-automation elevation mark, with no flowRunId, has every EMPTY owner_id stamped with the envelope's own userId ahead of the short-circuit, by the same stamp step 3.5 applies (nothing for the guest; an owner the body sets is kept; an owner_id supplied empty beside a supplied queue parks the row). Like a direct create, such an insert is the invoker's own record, so assignment rules (ADR-0142 D5), which route only a row whose owner and queue are both still empty, route neither; a body has no spelling today that asks a rule to route its row. The mark is set on every handler an action door dispatches (a host code action handler included) and by ObjectRepository.execute. A flow run, a hook's runAs: 'system', the seeders and every other system context still land the owner they write, or none, and an unowned, queue-less one is still routedthe step 3.5 guard block and the short-circuit that skips it are both inside registerAuthzMiddleware; the action-body exception is isActionBodyElevation
3Row-level read filter resolves to "no filter"plugin-securityGet: unscoped reads. Lose: row-level scoping entirelygetReadFilter
4Field-level security returns all fieldsplugin-securityGet: every column readable (getReadableFields) and writable (getWritableFields), and every field a disabled package withholds named to it (getMetadataReadableWithheldFields, so the served object's _withheldFields keeps every entry). Lose: field maskingresolveProjectionFieldMask, computeMetadataReadableWithheldFields
5Export permission granted unconditionallyplugin-securityGet: canExport is truecanExport
6Object-level read admission granted unconditionallyplugin-securityGet: canReadObject is true. This is the OBJECT-level half of a read — "may this caller read this object at all" — which the doors that bypass this middleware ask before they compile a statement of their own; getReadFilter is its row-level half, and the two are not interchangeablecanReadObject
6bWRITE admission granted unconditionallyplugin-securityGet: canWriteObject is true. The WRITE twin of the object-level read admission above, asked by the write PREVIEW (ObjectQL.validate()), which runs no middleware for its target object and so has no gate of its own. It exists because a validation rule that reads one hop through a reference field is evaluated against a related row fetched under system authority, and that elevation is bounded to the arms the question RUNS — named, ⛔ never a category of the write decision, and ⛔ not a promise the write would succeed. The arms: the ADR-0103 engine-owned affordance gate and the ADR-0090 D12 delegated-admin gate (both ahead of every resolution), the fail-closed postures (#3545's unresolvable posture, the D10 dangling delegator and, on a walled posture, the D10 delegator who is not a member of the organization the request runs in), the ADR-0066 D3 capability arm, the CRUD grant, the ADR-0090 D10 delegator arm that a bare CRUD-grant check misses, the field-level-security write gate over the caller's payload when one is supplied, and the ADR-0123 D2 no-active-organization wallcanWriteObject
6cThe tenant wall's per-row verdict for the write PREVIEW answers "not asked"plugin-securityGet: writeWallVerdict returns null, so ObjectQL.validate() treats the rows exactly as it does with no verdict registered: no row is refused by the Layer 0 tenant wall, and the elevated preview's readonly strips stay skipped as they always were. That is what the elevated write does: the whole security middleware short-circuits before step 3.7, so the wall never judges an elevated row's organization. Lose: nothing the write enforces. The verdict exists so a preview answers a row's organization as its write answers it (#25062), and an elevated write meets no tenant wall to answer forwriteWallVerdict
6dA system context is never read as a person outside every organizationcoreGet: the membership requirement (a person's data access requires a current membership in the organization, under every tenancy posture — ADR-0093 D8.1, as amended) does not judge it, so Layer 0's single branch and the single-posture write wall answer a system context as they always did. Lose: nothing — a system context is not a person, and it keeps the rule it hadisOutsideEveryOrganization
7Write bypass = true, effective write scope = orgplugin-securityGet: widest write scope without holding any capabilityregisterSecurityService
8Metadata-plane schema masking exempt (ADR-0106 D4)metadata-coreGet: unmasked object schema. Note: the exemption is a caller property — it short-circuits before the security service is consultedisObjectSchemaMaskExempt
8bAuthoring-trail reads admittedrest, runtimeGet: a metadata item's version history, audit rows and stored-version diff (GET /meta/:type/:name/history, /audit, /diff) without studio.access or manage_metadata, and a package's commit timeline (GET /packages/:id/commits) without studio.access. Note: narrower than the schema-mask exemption the draft switches ask (isObjectSchemaMaskExempt): neither door admits setup.access, which organization admins holdmayReadAuthoringTrail, requireCommitTrailReadCapability
9explain() and the effective-access read (describeEffectiveAccess) may target a principal other than the callerplugin-securityGet: no manage_users / delegated-admin check — both reads ask the one caller gateexplainAccessForCaller, mayDescribeAnotherUser
9bThe master-detail write check the security service serves (checkControlledByParentWrite, ADR-0055) answers allowplugin-securityGet: allow for any record, with no master judged — the write path's own first exit, so a gate composing it admits exactly what the record's own system-context update would. Lose: nothing a caller reaches today: its two consumers, the sys_attachment and sys_comment parent gates, return before they ask for a system sessioncheckControlledByParentWrite
10Anonymous-deny treats the caller as authenticatedcoreGet: passes the 401 seam with no userIdshouldDenyAnonymous
12Session-resolution middleware skippedplugin-authGet: no session lookup attemptedpackages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-plugin.ts#start
13Per-request performance timings disclosedobservabilityGet: timing headers a normal caller cannot pullisPerfDisclosurePrincipal
15MCP stdio bridge skips the object API-exposure gatemcpGet: the bridge reaches objects whose apiEnabled / apiMethods would refuse an external callerenforceApiExposure
16Read-audit rows are not writtenplugin-auditLose: the "a person opened this record" trail. sudo() keeps the caller's userId, so this flag is the only thing separating a human read from a platform oneinstallReadAuditWriter
17Approval snapshot payload redaction skipped, and so is the snapshot query guard and the reader-locale label overlayplugin-approvalsGet: the whole snapshot on find / findOne — the audit/replay channel — and a filter, sort or grouping by it on any read; and a request's process_label / current_step_label as stored, never in a locale the context carries, so nothing the platform reads back and writes again holds a reader's language. Lose: field-visibility redaction over approval payloads, the refusal of a query over the snapshot for a reader withheld a field of the objects it can reach, and the flow and step labels in the reader's languagebindSnapshotRedactionMiddleware, bindSnapshotPredicateGuard, bindReaderLocaleLabelsMiddleware
18REST anonymous-deny seam satisfiedrestGet: enforceAuth passes with no userId. Not reachable from the wire — isSystem is never set on an inbound requestenforceAuth
18bSettings namespace read scope not appliedservice-settingsGet: a read of sys_setting, sys_setting_audit or sys_platform_setting across every namespace, whatever each namespace's readPermission names — the settings service's own reads of its stores take this path. Lose: the per-namespace read gate the generic data API applies to every other caller, the same rule the settings routes enforcesettingsReadDoorMiddleware
18cCredential-column filter / sort refusal not applied — a where, orderBy, per-aggregation filter or expand entry naming a password / secret column is evaluatedobjectqlGet: the server's own match on a stored credential value, a lookup that never returns it. Every other caller, administrators included, is refused 400 INVALID_FIELD for anything but a has-a-value check (ADR-0100). Lose: nothing a wire caller reaches — isSystem is never set on an inbound requestrejectCredentialEvaluation
18dStored-metadata type read gate not applied — a read of sys_metadata / sys_metadata_history is not narrowed by the capability its row's type requiresobjectqlGet: every row of the family on find / findOne / count / aggregate — the metadata loader, the /meta doors' own store reads, boot (a read with no execution context is not narrowed either). Lose: the narrowing that serves a stored row of a capability-gated type (datasource, external_catalog) only to holders of the capability the /meta type gate names for itstoredMetadataTypeReadFilter
18einternal: true evaluate refusal not applied on the engine's read path — a filter, sort, group key, aggregation operand, per-aggregation filter, nested-relation condition or expand entry naming a field declared internal: true is evaluatedobjectqlGet: the server's own match on a flagged column (the API-key, share-link, SCIM-credential and approval-token lookups, the better-auth adapter), which still never returns the value. Every other caller of find / findOne / count / aggregate, administrators included, is refused 400 INVALID_FIELD; the data door asks the same judgement for every caller, a system context included. Lose: nothing a wire caller reaches — isSystem is never set on an inbound requestrejectInternalFieldEvaluation
18fFixed-read leaf recipient check not applied — a SharedRecordIds leaf (ADR-0155) that names another principal is handed on to the driverobjectqlGet: server code may hand the engine a share-table read for any recipient. Nothing on main writes the leaf yet; the sharing plugin starts at ADR-0155's last step. Every other caller's leaf must name its own user or its delegator, or the operation is refused 500 INTERNAL_ERROR before any driver is asked (ADR-0155 D4). The position, verb, class and driver-declaration checks apply to every caller, a system context included. Lose: nothing a wire caller reaches — no request can spell the leaf, and isSystem is never set on an inbound requestpassFixedReadLeaves

2. Write pipeline and data integrity

#Behaviour when isSystemPackageWhat you get / what you loseSymbol
19readonly strip bypassed — UPDATE, single rowobjectqlGet: a readonly field CAN be written. Lose: the protection that stops a caller seeding e.g. approval_statusupdate
20readonly strip bypassed — UPDATE, bulk/predicateobjectqlSame, on the multi-row pathupdate
21readonly strip bypassed — INSERTobjectqlSame, on create — one gate over BOTH create-side passes since the 2026-09-03 ruling moved the static-readonly strip in beside the runtime-owned one and deleted the DataProtocol ingress copy. isSystem is the only exemption on this path: preserveAudit is deliberately not read on create, so a non-system historical import is still stripped. A second read in the same symbol gates the pass that withholds those caller values from beforeInsert before the strip, the same exemption, so a system caller's hook still sees what it sentinsert
21breadonly strip bypassed — the write PREVIEW (ObjectQL.validate)objectqlSame as 19–21, in the preview: it runs the write's caller-write strips under the write's own gate, so a system preview reports no readonly drop and judges the value a system write would store. The computed strip of a formula value is NOT gated here or on either write verb — no driver has a column for it, so it runs for every callervalidate
22Strict-drop refusal never firesobjectqlLose: a caller that opted into loud refusal gets silence — strict refuses exactly what the strip would have taken, and the strip took nothing. Two exceptions, both judged in every context: a formula value, which the computed strip takes from every caller, and a value for a stored field that declares expression when it differs from the value the engine computes in its place (stored_expression), so strict still refuses bothinsert, packages/objectql/src/readonly-strict-errors.ts#READONLY_CLASS_REASONS
23Referential-integrity check skipped — except a runAs: 'system' flow's record writes, which keep itobjectqlGet: writes proceed against unreachable/unresolvable targets — a seed replay, an import, a restore or a cascade may store a reference to a row that does not exist yet. Lose: an isSystem caller can write a dangling reference. A flow run's elevated context (resolveRunDataContext) carries an internal mark that keeps the check, so a flow's create_record / update_record naming a row that does not exist is refused 400 VALIDATION_FAILED / reference_not_found, as on the user path; its authorization elevation is unchanged. A write the flow's write sets off (a hook's ctx.api, its sudo(), a cascade leg of a flow's delete) spreads the run's context and is checked as the flow's own, as on the user path. The mark is a symbol no flow definition or request can spell, and ExecutionContextSchema.parse drops it. Where a system write runs the check (a flow run's), it runs after the record's validation rules, as before; every other write runs it before them. An update's check does not judge again a value every row it lands on already stores; a system write compares those rows as stored, every other write only as the caller may read them, so a column the caller cannot read forgives nothingassertReferencesResolve, referencesCheckedBeforeRules, storedReferencesCallerReads
23bPosition-catalog check skipped — a sys_user_position write whose position names no position in the security catalog is not refusedplugin-securityGet: a system writer can store an assignment naming no position — the seed loader writes stack.data from AppPlugin.start() under a system context, as invitation acceptance and the platform's own bootstraps do. Lose: such a row grants nothing and nothing says so. A non-system insert, or a non-system update that changes position, is refused 400 VALIDATION_FAILED / reference_not_found instead when the security catalog holds no position of that name: the environment registry (ADR-0131 D3), one per deployment, which takes no organization, so a name only a sys_position row carries — any organization's — is refused like one nobody carries. It is the same stand-down as the engine's referential-integrity check for a lookup columnassertPositionNamesCatalogRow
23cGrant-name catalog check skipped — a sys_user_permission_set write whose permission_set names no permission set in the security catalog is not refusedplugin-securityGet: a system writer can store a grant naming a set not yet registered — seed replay and boot provisioning may write the grant before the definition it names is registered. Lose: such a row grants nothing and nothing says so. A non-system insert, or a non-system update that changes permission_set, is refused 400 VALIDATION_FAILED / reference_not_found instead when the security catalog holds no set by that name, and 409 RESOURCE_CONFLICT naming the holders when two packages hold it and the write names neither, or names a package that does not hold it (ADR-0150 D3/D5, #32164); a grant that names no set at all is refused required for every caller. The grant names its set by name, and by package in permission_set_package when it names one (ADR-0150 D4); nothing derives the name from permission_set_id (ADR-0131 D4, D10)packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-permission-set-name.ts#onInsert, packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-permission-set-name.ts#onUpdate
23dGrant-holder membership check skipped — a sys_user_position or sys_user_permission_set write naming a user with no sys_member row in the row's organization is not refusedplugin-securityGet: a system writer can store such a grant — invitation acceptance writes the membership and its placement together, and seed replay, the organization-admin reconcile and the platform bootstraps write grants as the system. Lose: such a row takes effect once its user is admitted to the organization. A non-system insert, or a non-system update that moves user_id or organization_id, is refused 400 VALIDATION_FAILED / reference_not_found at user_id instead, for every caller, a platform administrator included; the membership is read as { isSystem: true, tenantId } with tenantId the row's own organization, never another one. A row stored with no organization is not judged. Under single, 18.0 stamps a new grant with the Default Organization, so such a row is one an earlier release wrotepackages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-holder-membership-refusal.ts#onInsert, packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-holder-membership-refusal.ts#onUpdate
23eA secret field takes a stored reference as given — a value already spelled secret: is stored unchangedobjectqlGet: a system writer may copy a secret: reference onto a record as it stands (seed replay, a migration). Every other caller may only seal a new value or keep its own record's ref, and its own is the value it reads in that column: on a create any such value is refused, and on an update it would be kept only where every record the write lands on serves exactly that reference to this caller's own read door. The read path serves a secret column masked to every caller, so every reference such a caller sends is refused 400 VALIDATION_ERROR before anything is written, with one answer whatever it names and whatever the column holds; an echoed read mask still leaves the column as it is. Lose: the check that the reference is the record's own — a system writer that copies one is trusted to mean it. Inbound HTTP never carries the flagencryptSecretFields
23fAgent ceiling grant check skipped — a sys_user_permission_set write naming an MCP agent ceiling set is not refusedplugin-securityGet: a system writer that is not a seed is not judged. The platform-admin promotion and the organization-admin reconcile name their sets in code, and neither is a ceiling; the self-registration grant writes the configured audience.selfRegistrationPermissionSet, which the audience validation (assertAudienceConfig, plugin-auth) refuses when it names an agent ceiling set; an identity-provider group mapping is refused at its save, and its projected grant again before each write, when its set is outside the organization boundary; the development-only demo-staff seed grants only sets its stack declares, and no stack declares an agent ceiling's name. Lose: nothing on this table — a seed write (seedReplay: a stack's data, a published seed item) is judged like a non-system one. A non-system or seed insert, or such an update whose resulting row names one, is refused 400 VALIDATION_FAILED / invalid_value at permission_set, for every caller, a platform administrator included; a sys_user_position write naming a position whose definition names one is refused invalid_value at position for every writer, a system one included, except a system update that leaves the position as stored; a delete is not judged (ADR-0090 D10). These hooks, the metadata door's position gate and the SecurityPlugin baseline check are the doors that hold the rule; they do not judge a position a person holds without an assignment row, or a position definition that reaches the security catalog without passing the metadata door, and whether the read side refuses those is a separate decision with the maintainer (the security seat, #32004)packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/agent-ceiling-grant-refusal.ts#judges
23gAI service account grant check skipped — a sys_user_permission_set or sys_user_position write giving an AI service account a set above the agent ceiling is not refusedplugin-securityGet: a system writer is not judged. The organization-admin reconcile binds nothing for an account, and the platform bootstraps grant only people. Lose: seed replay writes the grants its stack declares, unjudged, so a seed that gives an account a set carrying View All, Modify All, transfer, restore, purge, a system permission or an admin scope stores it; those bits are still cleared when the account's sets are evaluated (packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/agent-ceiling-clamp.ts). A non-system insert, or a non-system update whose resulting row gives an account such a set (directly, or through a position binding one), is refused 400 VALIDATION_FAILED / invalid_value at permission_set or position, for every caller, a platform administrator included; the holder's sys_user row is read as the system only when the caller's own door reads it; a delete is not judgedpackages/plugins/plugin-security/src/agent-account-grant-refusal.ts#onInsert, packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/agent-account-grant-refusal.ts#onUpdate
23hA grant's package column, sent on an update, is judged rather than ignored — a system writer's permission_set_package reaches the package stampplugin-securityGet: the boot backfill and os migrate stored-references bind bind a grant to the package that holds its set by writing the column alone (ADR-0150 D8 R1), and a package that holds the set lands as written. Lose: nothing a holder could not already do — a named package that does not hold the set is refused 409 RESOURCE_CONFLICT, not-held-by-qualifier, naming the holders, at any holder count, and the row is left as it was (#32164, F3); on insert every writer's named package is judged the same way. The same stamp serves sys_audience_binding_suggestion (R3, its permission_set_package beside permission_set_name): a system insert or column-only update there naming a package that does not hold the set, FROM re-stamped (insert) or landed as written (update) TO the same 409, the row left as it was; os migrate stored-references bind --table sys_audience_binding_suggestion writes through it. A non-system update's permission_set_package never reaches the stamp: the engine's readonly update strip drops it, so it is never stored and never judged. The same seam keeps one grant of a set per user and organization, as the grant's key before #32164 did (two packages' sets of one name excepted): on an update it judges the package the row stores after the write, a system writer's value or else the stored one, and it reads the other grants of the same user, set and organization as the system, in the writer's transaction, answering only the old key's duplicate-record refusal (409), never a row. It runs after the grant table's other refusals, and for a non-system write it steps aside on a holder the write names that the caller's own read does not return: the engine's reference check answers that holder as a user that does not exist (#29029)packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/stored-permission-set-package-stamp.ts#onUpdate, #oneGrantOnUpdate, #holderLeftToEngine
24Tenant-audit warning silenced; bypassTenantAudit threaded to the driverobjectqlGet: unscoped system writes stop warning. Lose: the signal that would flag a genuine user-path scoping bugbuildDriverOptions
25Engine-owned / append-only write guard bypassedplugin-securityGet: generic writes to managedBy engine-owned objects. Except app-automation's elevation on a ledger: an update, delete, transfer, restore or purge of an object declared managedBy: 'append-only' from app-automation's elevation (a flow run's, an app-authored hook's, an action body's, read by elevationSource) is refused PERMISSION_DENIED ahead of the short-circuit, by the same predicate, in assertAppAutomationAppendOnlyWriteAllowed; so is such a context's delete of a record a ledger row references, whose reference clean-up would change that row; an insert is not judged by this check; the platform's own writers, whose system context carries neither a run nor the mark, are unchangedpackages/plugins/plugin-security/src/system-write-guard.ts#isUserContextWrite, packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/system-write-guard.ts#assertEngineOwnedWriteAllowed, packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/flow-system-identity-write-refusal.ts#elevationSource
26Identity write guard bypassed (ADR-0092)plugin-authGet: direct writes to identity tables through the generic data pathpackages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/identity-write-guard.ts#isUserContextWrite
26bAPI key restore guard does not refuseplugin-authGet: a write setting revoked: false on a sys_api_key row an administrator's forced password reset revoked, or a platform administrator suspended (administrator_suspended), is admitted without the platform-administrator check a user-context restore must pass; the reason is still cleared. A system revoke is never stamped administrator_suspended: a host that suspends a key writes that reason itself, beside revoked: true. Lose: nothing a caller reaches: no system writer restores a key, and the mint, the last-used stamp and the forced reset itself never set revoked: falsepackages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/api-key-restore-guard.ts#isUserContextWrite
26cPer-user owner rule does not refuse — a sys_personal_view or sys_user_preference update that changes user_id is admittedplugin-authGet: a system writer can move a personal view or a preference to another owner (no shipped system writer does). The system writer includes app-authored automation elevated to system (a runAs: 'system' flow, a hook's runAs: 'system' api or ctx.api.sudo(), an action body's ctx.api), the family packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/flow-system-identity-write-refusal.ts names, so an app's automation can move one; the rule reads no app-automation elevation mark. Lose: nothing a caller reaches. A non-system update whose user_id differs from the stored owner is refused 403 PERMISSION_DENIED, for every caller, a platform administrator included; an echo of the stored owner is no change. One shared check holds it for both objects. The rule exists because, for an organization member, member_default's '*' update floor (created_by == current_user.id) applies to an update beside the object's own row scopepackages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/owner-fixed-rule.ts#isOwnerChange
27Search-companion column kept in a read's rows when it was explicitly requestedobjectqlGet: the internal companion column is readable. Lose: nothing for app code — this is the engine reading its own indexstripSearchCompanionFromRead
28Dependent-count disclosure on a blocked deleteobjectqlGet: the count of blocking children. Nothing was elevated past the caller, so nothing is withhelddependentCountIsDisclosable
29Reference-cleanup log attributes the write to 'system'objectqlGet: an honest actor label instead of anonymous when the context carries neither userId nor actorrecordReferenceCheckElevation
29bA traversing validation rule's related read skips the caller's boundsobjectqlGet: no row bound from the caller's own read on a related object no organization wall scopes, no read door on a header the rule reads through a master_detail field, and a related read even with no organization under a walled posture (a tenantId on the context still scopes it). Every caller that is not system is held to all three: a header its read door does not return is unavailable to the rule exactly as a header that exists nowhere is, whatever it holds, and a header it can read is judged on its stored values. A plain lookup to an object an organization wall scopes asks no read door, system caller or notresolveOneHopRelated
29cA detail write's master-detail header read asks no read doorobjectqlGet: the write binds the header a parent-scoped requiredWhen / readonlyWhen reads as parent from the header's stored row whoever can read it, as before. Every caller that is not system meets its own read door first: a header that read does not return answers as a header that exists nowhere — an unbound parent, and reference_not_found on the reference check (which a system caller's write skips, a flow run's excepted)masterDetailHeadersCallerReads
29dThe recycle bin's tenant wall does not apply: restore, purge and empty read and remove every organization's entriesobjectqlGet: the bin's own doors reach any entry, as the system reaches every wall. Every caller that is not system is held to the Layer-0 verdict: one the wall denies (a signed-in caller with no active organization under a walled posture) sees no entry, so restore answers null, purge false and empty 0, and the removal is scoped by the verdict the security layer recorded on the dispatch when it recorded one (#30237)recycleBinWallDenies
29eA restore of an entry someone else deleted asks no recycle-bin grantobjectqlGet: the system restores any entry. Every caller that is not system restores only the entries whose deleted_by is its own userId unless its effective permissions grant manageRecycleBin on the entry's object; otherwise 403 PERMISSION_DENIED, and the same refusal when no permission resolver is registered or it throws (#30237, ADR-0148 D5)assertCallerMayRestoreEntry
29fListing the recycle bin of an object asks no recycle-bin grantobjectqlGet: the system lists every entry of any object the bin takes. Every caller that is not system lists an object's entries only when its effective permissions grant manageRecycleBin on the object; otherwise 403 PERMISSION_DENIED, and the same refusal when no permission resolver is registered or it throws (#30237, ADR-0148 D5)assertCallerManagesRecycleBin
30Bulk data event organizationId OMITTED — the batch is published "not asserted"plugin-securityGet: nothing — the data.records.* event still publishes. Lose: the per-organization attribution: this exit is taken before the security middleware composes any tenant wall, so it records no Layer 0 verdict on the operation (OperationContext.tenantLayer0Verdict, #15813), and the engine's bulk producer — which reads that recorded verdict and nothing else — omits the key rather than filling it from the caller's tenantId; a tenant-scoped consumer then does not deliver the event inside an organization wall (#15225)registerAuthzMiddleware
30bThe import doors admit a control opt-out — runAutomations: false and treatAsHistorical: true on POST /data/:object/import and /import/jobsrestGet: an import whose rows are written with skipAutomations (no metadata-bound hook, no record-change trigger: an app's approvals and record freezes among them) or with skipStateMachine and preserveAudit. Every other caller, every signed-in user and administrator included, is refused 403 PERMISSION_DENIED before the body is parsed, so nothing is written and no job is created. Inbound HTTP never carries the flag, so this is an in-process caller's door. Note: the flag still suppresses none of those controls by itself (see below); it only admits the opt-outs that doimportControlOptOutRefusal
30cThe import undo keeps the control skips — POST /data/import/jobs/:jobId/undorestGet: an undo whose deletes and restores are written with skipAutomations and skipStateMachine, so no metadata-bound hook, record-change trigger or state_machine rule refuses a reversal. Every other caller, every signed-in user and administrator included, undoes under those controls: a reversal one of them refuses is reported per row in the undo answer's failures and kept in the job's undo log, and the job is stamped reverted only once every row is. A historical job's preserveAudit belongs to the job, not the caller, and rides every undo. Inbound HTTP never carries the flag, so this is an in-process caller's doorimportUndoWriteContext

3. Sharing (plugin-sharing)

One of the largest consumers of the flag; node scripts/isystem-census.mjs --json lists every site with its package.

#Behaviour when isSystemWhat you get / what you loseSymbol
31Sharing-rule REVOCATION is skipped on the record-afterDelete hook — and on that hook onlyLose: nothing permanently — the revoke is delivered, but deferred on the unbounded shape. The payload belongs to another subscriber: packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/record-share-cascade.ts binds on every sharing-capable object and stashes for system writes on its own account (#5103). When the deleted ids are enumerable it revokes inline; when they are not — a predicate delete whose row set the stash could not resolve — it hands the reclaim to a queued background orphan sweep instead, so the share rows outlive the deleted records until that sweep runs, with the boot orphan sweep behind it. No surviving record loses access either way, and a restart re-runs the same sweep. This is one subscriber declining work another owns, not elevation silencing a consequence. ⚠️ Grant MATERIALISATION no longer asks — the afterInsert / afterUpdate skips, and the before* stash skip that fed them, were removed by the 2026-08-31 ruling on #13533; a system write materialises exactly as a user write doesbindRuleHooks
32Sharing write verdict short-circuits to allowGet: writes pass the sharing gate unconditionallybypassVerdict
33Record visibility / manage-shares checks return trueGet: no ownership or Modify-All requirementcanManageShares, assertCanManageShares, shouldBypass
34grant() skips the enforcement + manage-shares assertionsGet: the rule evaluator can materialise through the public API. Note it is not a bare skip: the system branch asserts the grant is not inert instead (a grant on an object no verdict can consult is refused). The system path alone also keys the upsert on the rule's source_id, so two rules reaching one user on one record keep one row each; any other caller keeps one row per recipientgrant
35revoke() deletes directly, before the non-manual-source guardGet: the evaluator can revoke its own grants. Lose: the CONFLICT guard that warns a rule-materialised grant will be silently re-granted on the next reconcilerevoke (the guard it deletes in front of is in the same function)
36listShares() skips the management gateGet: full enumeration of who can see a recordlistShares
37sys_record_share reads are not self-scopedGet: tenant-wide share listing without manage_sharingbuildSharingMiddleware
38Share-link policy enabled check bypassed; system callers re-enter under a system contextGet: link creation while the policy is off — resolution is not bypassed since #14033 (publicSharing.enabled is a standing policy held at every redemption): a link minted this way does not resolve until the block is enabledcreateLink, revokeLink, listLinks
39Sharing-rule provenance stamp skippedLose: the row is not marked as an admin customization — seeder / defineRule / boot reconcilers are "the package door"bindRuleProvenanceStamp
40Sharing-rule service write + delete paths return earlyLose: the manage-rules gate on the service surface and the declared-name guard on sys_sharing_rule writes (a new row or a rename taking a declared rule's name, 409) — defineRule makes that check itself before its own system write, and the other system writers are the platform's machinery (the ownership ceremony, migrations); and the object-enforcement guard on the same writes (a rule whose object is not under record-sharing enforcement, 422 SHARING_NOT_ENABLED), which defineRule likewise makes for its non-system callersassertCanManageRules, bindDeclaredRuleNameGuard, bindRuleObjectEnforcementGuard, defineRule

4. Approvals, attachments, comments, knowledge

#Behaviour when isSystemPackageWhat you get / what you loseSymbol
41Approval record lock released — a locked record, and its master-detail rows, are writableplugin-approvalsGet: engine self-writes (the status mirror) pass, and so do system writes to a locked master's detail rows. Lose: the lock that stops edits to the record and its detail rows while an approval is live. Note there is deliberately no admin exemption here — only isSystembindApprovalLockHook, bindDetailRowLockHook
42Delegation write guard bypassedplugin-approvalsGet: service / seed / import may write delegation rows naming another delegatorbindDelegationWriteGuard
43Approval actor / submitter / pending-approver checks bypassed (9 sites)plugin-approvalsGet: approve, reject, recall, reassign without being a pending approver or the submitter, and a decision or comment that attaches files the actor did not upload (every other caller attaches only files it uploaded, in the request's organization)isOverrideActor, resolveActor, sendBack, resubmit, reassign, remind, requestInfo, comment, assertAttachmentsUploadedByCaller
44Attachment access hooks return early (insert + update + delete, the referenced-file check on insert + update, and the read AST)service-storageLose: attachment visibility scopinginstallAttachmentAccessHooks, installAttachmentFileReferenceGate, installAttachmentReadVisibility
45Comment access hooks return early (insert + update + delete, and the read AST), and so do the activity and audit-log read gates (their read AST), the activity field redaction and the audit-log field redaction (the rows a read serves), the activity summary's message code (the rows a read serves), and the query guard over both objects' value-bearing columns (the read AST)plugin-auditGet: the whole activity row and the whole sys_audit_log row, its before/after snapshots included, and the activity row's stored summary code (metadata.summary_message), on find / findOne — the audit writer, each read gate's bounded probe and the activity backfill — and a filter, sort or grouping by those columns. Lose: comment visibility scoping, the narrowing of sys_activity and of sys_audit_log to rows whose parent record the caller can read, the redaction of a parent field's value from an activity row's text and recorded change and from a ledger row's before/after snapshots, the withholding of an activity row recording an update whose every changed field the reader is withheld, of a fired milestone row whose watched fields it is not all served, and of an unstamped row (on count and aggregate too, so a total agrees with the rows), the removal of that summary code from the activity row's metadata (its params are field values), and the refusal of a query over those columns for a reader withheld a field of the objects it can reachinstallCommentAccessHooks, installCommentReadVisibility, installActivityReadVisibility, installAuditLogReadVisibility, installActivityFieldRedaction, installAuditLogFieldRedaction, installActivitySummaryLocale, installParentFieldQueryGuard
46Knowledge search returns hits unfilteredservice-knowledgeLose: the permission filter over search resultsapplyPermissionFilter
47The inbound-mail read gates return early (the read AST)service-mailboxGet: every sys_mail_message and sys_mail_association row on find / findOne — the ingest writer and each gate's own pre-scan, which read the association and mailbox rows a decision needs. Lose: the narrowing of a message to callers who can read a record it is associated with or who own its mailbox (so the unassociated pool is restricted), and of an association to callers who can read the record it names (on count and aggregate too, so a total agrees with the rows)gateMiddleware
47bThe inbound-mail ingest seam: ingest admits the system context ALONE, and rematch admits it without the organization, owner or manage_mailboxes checkservice-mailboxGet: a mail source hands a mailbox its messages, and server code re-matches any mailbox. Lose: nothing a user held — every other caller of ingest is refused (PERMISSION_DENIED), because an ingested message is shown on every record its correspondents' addresses match and a user who could hand the seam a message could write one in a correspondent's name; every other caller of rematch must be in the mailbox's organization and own the mailbox or hold manage_mailboxesingest, authorizeRematch
47cThe inbound-mail IMAP sync: syncMailbox and syncAll admit the system context ALONEservice-mailboxGet: the sync job reads every mailbox row (its organization, address and IMAP cursor), writes the cursor back, and hands each fetched message to ingest under the system context. Lose: nothing a user held — every other caller is refused (PERMISSION_DENIED), because a sync stores a mailbox's mail and moves its cursorsyncMailbox, syncAll
47dThe print service REFUSES the system context: printRecordToFile admits a human user acting for themselves aloneservice-printGet: nothing — a system caller is refused (PERMISSION_DENIED) before any page is read, session minted or browser started. Lose: nothing a user held — the PDF is rendered as the requesting user and never as the system, so a record is archived only by someone who could read itrefuseUnlessHumanCaller
47eThe caller-scoped attach verbs REFUSE the system context: attachFileAs and assertMayAttach admit a signed-in user alone, and so do the caller-scoped record-file verbs the MCP read_file and create_upload_link tools call (listRecordFilesAs, readRecordFileAs, createUploadLinkAs, createUploadLinkForNewRecordAs)service-storageGet: nothing — a system caller is refused (PERMISSION_DENIED); the system attaches through attachFile, whose rows name no user. Lose: nothing a user held — the caller-scoped verbs insert the attachment under the caller's context so every insert gate judges that user and both rows name them, and the record-file verbs read the record and judge the file as that user, and bind an upload link to them; createUploadLinkForNewRecordAs names no record, so it asks the object's create verdict and the field's writability as that user insteadpackages/services/service-storage/src/file-attachment-service.ts#requireUserContext, packages/services/service-storage/src/record-file-access.ts#requireUserContext
47fThe file-reference claim path asks no read verdict of a system write: a record write claims or copies a referenced file only as its caller may read it (the download door's verdict), and a system write carries no caller to askservice-storageGet: a system write claims or copies any file the organization-scoped lookup reaches, as before #25692; a deliberate server-side copy between records runs this way. The exception is a file uploaded through an upload link that names no record (#32686), and the ids such a link answers before its upload (its own, and those it reserves for a several-file upload): until a record has held the file, only its uploader's own write takes it, so a system write naming it is refused at the field. Once a record holds it, a system write copies it as any; once a record lets it go, it is judged as any released file. Lose: nothing a user held — a user write is judged by the download door's verdict, and a context-less programmatic write is not asked eitherreferencingCallerOf
47gThe sys_file storage-owned columns guard returns early on create: a system insert keeps the key, mime_type, size, status and etag it writesservice-storageGet: the storage service's own inserts (the upload doors, the field-file copy and backfill) write those five columns. Lose: nothing a user held — a non-system create has them dropped and starts pending, and on update the same columns are readonly, so the UPDATE readonly strip keeps them for every non-system callerinstallSysFileStorageOwnedColumnsGuard

5. Actions, metadata plane, provenance, the organization wall

#Behaviour when isSystemPackageWhat you get / what you loseSymbol
48Object API-exposure gate bypassed (apiEnabled / apiMethods)runtimeGet: internal self-writes ignore exposure declarations — these govern external exposure, not engine self-writes. The gate is refuseUnexposedDataAction, which callData asks first and the /data domain asks before its request gate; callData reads the same bypass once more for each nested-relation condition's targetcallData, refuseUnexposedDataAction
49Action requiredPermissions bypassed, and an action call's selection is not read firstruntimeGet: engine self-invocation runs any action, and a call's params._selectedIds is handed on without the caller-scope read every other caller's selection gets (the system principal reads every row anyway)actionPermissionError, actionSelectionIsRead
50manage_metadata bypassed on metadata writesruntime, restGet: schema writes without the capability (the permission-set clone door's save included) — and, because REST's save door and the stored-version read doors ask one save verdict, an app's full stored version on /layers, ?layers=true and /diff, whatever its entry gates withholdhandleMetadataRequest, registerMetaCollectionRoutes, registerMetaItemWriteRoutes, registerMetaItemHistoryRoutes, metaSaveVerdict, handlePermissionSetCloneWrite
50bsetup.write bypassed on the record-currency code backfill doorrestGet: POST /meta/_migrate-record-currency-codes without the capability. The door still fills only the caller's current organization's rows: a system context with no organization is refused like any other callerregisterMetaRecordCurrencyBackfillRoute
50csetup.write bypassed on the unit code backfill doorrestGet: POST /meta/_migrate-unit-codes without the capability, as the record-currency code backfill door is. The door still converts only the caller's current organization's rows: a system context with no organization is refused like any other callerregisterMetaUnitCodeBackfillRoute
51The shared metadata-write verdict itself returns allowedmetadata-coreGet: the one function all of row 50's doors consult answers yes before any capability is examinedmetaWriteCapabilityVerdict
52Anonymous-deny seam satisfied on the domain dispatchers and the package/federation routesruntime, restGet: passes with no userIdhandleActionsRequest, dispatchActionRequest, resumeActionRunRequest, handleAIRequest, handleAutomationRequest, handleMetadataRequest, handleSecurityRequest, handlePackagesRequest, handleAnalyticsRequest, handleI18nRequest, registerExternalDatasourceRoutes, refusePackageRequest
53MCP principal check satisfiedruntimeGet: MCP surface reachable with no userhandleMcpRequest
54Package REST route capability gate bypassedrestGet: a marketplace publish over REST (POST /packages/publish, the one route the REST registrar mounts since #14503) without manage_metadata; the package read cohort (studio.access / setup.access) is enforced by the dispatcher /packages domain's own read gate, where the reads are servedrefusePackageRequest
55Package domain capability gates bypassedruntimeGet: package management and package-inventory reads without the capabilityrequireManageMetadata, requireReadCapability
56Activation write / authoring refusals do not fireruntimeGet: activation artifacts writable and authorable without the activation-authoring capabilityrefuseUngrantedActivationWrite, refuseUngrantedActivationAuthoring
55bWalled environment-metadata refusal does not firemetadata-core, rest, runtimeGet: under isolated / group, a write of the environment's metadata, of any type, at the /meta write doors (save, reset, publish, rollback) and POST /meta/_migrate-stored on both transports, at every /packages write door (create, the manifest PATCH, enable, disable, publish, publish-drafts, discard-drafts, revert, rollback, commits/:commitId/revert, duplicate, adopt-orphans, delete), at the /automation definition writes (create, update, delete, clone), at the permission-set clone door, at the import of a remote table as an object (the REST import route and the MCP import_object tool), at the open MCP server's draft save and discard (save_metadata_draft, delete_metadata_draft), and at the refresh of a federated datasource's cached catalog. Every other caller below the platform-operator rung is refused 403 there (ADR-0131 D3, D12 items 7–8, D11), because one organization's write would change what every organization resolves. The seeders, the package door and migrations write the environment's metadata this way. Under single the refusal is inert for every callerwalledCatalogWriteVerdict, walledCatalogRefusal, refuseWalledCatalogPackageWrite, refuseWalledFlowDefinitionWrite, registerExternalDatasourceRoutes, federationService, openWriter
57Automation run-state read, flow-authoring write, the paused-run caller gate (screen read and resume), the two operator run-lifecycle writes, and the elevated self-triggered start, the AI-service-account elevated start and the start-record check at every door that starts a flow by name all passruntimeGet: run state, flow writes, a paused run's screen and its resume with no grant and without being the run's starter — and cancelling or restoring a suspension without the platform-operator rung. The screen read and the resume ask one predicate, so this is one bypass for both. The lifecycle bypass is the in-process owner's door: plugin-approvals' revise-window recall (ADR-0044) cancels on behalf of a decision it already authorized and recorded. And starting a flow declared runAs: 'system' whose type is self-triggered (autolaunched, record_change, schedule) through any door that starts a flow by name — the trigger route, an action of type: 'flow' (REST /actions and the MCP run_action bridge) and a declared endpoint of type: 'flow' — which every other caller, the guest principal included, is refused 403 PERMISSION_DENIED (the maintainer's rulings, letters B and A) — and starting, through the same doors, a flow whose requiredPermissions the caller does not hold (ruling record 6377848497, letter A) — and starting, through the same doors, a flow declared runAs: 'system' as an AI service account (an agent acting for itself, with no onBehalfOf) where the action's ai.exposed: true opt-in is not in hand, which that account is refused 403 PERMISSION_DENIED (ADR-0151 Non-goals, ruling record 6812617393, letter C; a trigger route and a declared endpoint carry no opt-in, so there it is always refused, and the refusal names the action door that admits it). And starting, through the same doors, a flow on a record key the caller's own scope does not deliver, which every other caller is refused with the action door's 404 RECORD_NOT_FOUND before the run exists (and 400 VALIDATION_FAILED for a key that is not one id, or for an elevated start that names no object). The three doors ask one check, so this is one bypass for all of them, and it is the in-process caller's, such as a job: inbound HTTP never carries the flagmayReadRunState, refuseUngrantedFlowWrite, isRunStarterOrRunStateReader, refuseUngrantedRunLifecycleWrite, flowStartRefusal, refuseUnreadableFlowStartRecords
57bConnector credential door's capability and posture gates passruntimeGet: listing, setting and clearing the environment's stored connector credentials (/automation/connectors/credential-refs) without manage_metadata, and under the group / isolated postures, where the door refuses every other caller 403 PERMISSION_DENIED naming the posture, the platform operator included, because the store is environment-level. The bypass is the in-process caller's: inbound HTTP never carries the flag. Get nothing more about the value: no answer of this door carries itrefuseUngrantedConnectorCredentialAccess, refuseWalledConnectorCredentialAccess
57cConnector connection door's capability gate passesruntimeGet: reading, beginning, completing (the OAuth callback) and revoking an organization's connection of an oauth2 authorization_code connector instance (/automation/connectors/:name/connection, /automation/connectors/oauth/callback, ADR-0143 D5) without manage_metadata. No posture refuses it: a connection belongs to its organization. The bypass is the in-process caller's: inbound HTTP never carries the flag. Get nothing more: no answer of this door carries a token, and the callback's state is still bound to the user and organization that began the connectrefuseUngrantedConnectorConnectionAccess
58Audience-binding suggestion authority gate passesplugin-securityGet: a system caller lists, accepts and dismisses suggestions without manage_metadata and, under a wall, without the platform-operator rungassertDeploymentAuthority
59Email-template organization door passes; webhook provenance stamp skippedplugin-email, plugin-webhooksGet (sys_email_template): a create or update of a template row. The door refuses every other write that names a caller, 403 PERMISSION_DENIED (ADR-0131 D6); the plugin itself no longer writes the table (templates resolve from the registry), so the v18 migration ceremony's promotion is the one remaining writer. Lose (sys_webhook): the row is not marked as an admin customization, and the declared-name guard does not run (a new row or a rename taking a declared webhook's name, 409) — the system writers are the platform's machinery (the legacy-secret sweep, the ownership ceremony, migrations)isOrganizationWrite, bindWebhookProvenanceStamp, bindDeclaredWebhookNameGuard
60Automation flow data nodes re-add the owner_id stamp (the one place row 2's gap is compensated inline)service-automationGet: a flow-authored INSERT under system elevation still lands owned, when the run resolved a user. Fill-only — flow-authored values winstampSystemInsertOwner, called from packages/services/service-automation/src/builtin/crud-nodes.ts#registerCrudNodes
61Inbox caller refusal names isSystem as what was carriedservice-messagingGet: nothing — the refusal still fires. The flag only shapes the diagnostic, because privilege is not an authorization subjectresolveInboxRecipient
61bThe principal-session mint refuses a system contextplugin-authGet: nothing — mintPrincipalSession answers PERMISSION_DENIED / 403 before anything is minted. A principal session acts as the requesting user and never as the system, so a render or any other in-process act that needs a session must carry the user's own contextrefuseUpFront
62organization_id is not auto-stamped on INSERT — the organization-axis twin of the owner_id gap aboveorganizationsGet: an elevated write may name another organization deliberately, which is what the per-organization seed replay, the orphan-row claim, imports and migrations all rely on. Lose: the fill-only stamp, so an elevated insert that names no organization lands organization_id = NULL and the wall hides it. ⛔ Neither path rewrites a supplied organization_id: the non-elevated path fills only an absent one, and a supplied value meets the Layer 0 write wall, which refuses a forged one 403 PERMISSION_DENIED exactly as it refuses an update re-pointing a row. Elevation skips the stamp and the wall alike, which is why it is the seam the legitimate cross-organization writers usepackages/plugins/organizations/src/organizations-plugin.ts#start
62bMCP list_actions asks no membership-grade mark of a system caller — an organization action whose endpoint (/organization/...) the caller's membership grade does not reach is listed without unavailableruntimeGet: nothing a run would not give. The mark is a courtesy reading of the caller's own positions (ruling record 6812625052, letter E: list and mark, do not hide), and a system context carries no person's grades, so it is left unmarked, as a delegated agent's envelope is. Every other caller whose positions name none of the grades the MEMBERSHIP_REACH rows for that endpoint list sees the row marked PERMISSION_DENIED. Lose: nothing — neither run door reads the mark, and the organization endpoint still judges the callmembershipReachRefusal

6. Reads that only carry the flag onward

Not behaviours: these five sites read the flag solely to copy it into another context or envelope, or to take it off one. They are listed because the census counts them, and because a reader tracing where elevation travels needs them.

#SymbolPackageWhat it does
63buildSessionobjectqlPropagates isSystem into the hook session so hooks can tell engine self-writes from user writes
64isSystemobjectqlScopedContext.isSystem getter — re-exposes the underlying execution context's flag
65executionContextFromHookruntimeRebuilds an ExecutionContext from a hook session, carrying the flag across
65bcallerScopeOfruntimeTakes a script body's own elevation off its caller's envelope (the app-automation mark and the flag it came with), so ctx.email.send and ctx.activity.append read the record a body points at in the caller's scope. It removes the flag and grants nothing
66toolCallPrincipalOfmcpProjects the host's resolved ExecutionContext into the frozen principal an installed MCP tool-call interceptor reads, carrying isSystem: true only for a system caller. It decides nothing: the tool still runs under its own context

What isSystem does not do

Just as costly as the list above. Each of these is a separate switch, and assuming isSystem covers it is a documented source of bugs.

AssumptionRealityAnchor
"It suppresses triggers / record-change automation"No. Only skipTriggers does. A bare { isSystem: true } on a seed write re-fired automation on freshly seeded rows and wedged first bootpackages/metadata-protocol/src/seed-loader.ts#SEED_OPTIONS (rationale at #writeDeferredReference, #3760), packages/spec/src/automation/flow.zod.ts#runAs
"It skips the state machine"No. That is skipStateMachine, carried by seed replay and by treatAsHistorical importspackages/objectql/src/engine.ts FSM gate; see State Machine
"It skips validation rules"No. Field shape, format, script and the rest still run. The readonly strip runs before validation precisely so a discarded value is not judgedpackages/objectql/src/engine-insert.ts#insert
"It preserves a supplied updated_at / updated_by"No. That is preserveAudit, a separate opt-in — and an UPDATE-path exemption onlypackages/spec/src/data/field.zod.ts#readonly (#3493 / #6640)
"It stamps created_by"No. Audit stamping reads userId from the context. A user-less system write stamps nothing — that is today's behaviour, not an errorpackages/services/service-automation/src/runtime-identity.ts#stampSystemInsertOwner
"It bypasses every guard"No. The last-admin guard applies to every context, isSystem included — the deprovision path that actually locks an org out is the system onepackages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/last-admin-guard.ts
"A client can request it"No. Never settable from inbound HTTP or from an action bodypackages/rest/src/rest-server.ts#enforceAuth; packages/runtime/src/domains/actions.ts#handleActionsRequest

Known rough edges

Recorded rather than smoothed over, because a reader who hits one of these should recognise it instead of re-deriving it.

  1. The owner_id gap has two independent compensations and no shared mechanism. Row 2 is a real gap; the platform repairs it twice, in unrelated places — inline for automation flow writes (packages/services/service-automation/src/runtime-identity.ts#stampSystemInsertOwner, whose own comment states the reason: "the security middleware that stamps it short-circuits on isSystem — so the writer fills it here"), and as a boot-time sweep for seeded rows (packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/claim-seed-ownership.ts). Any third system write path gets neither. If you add one, stamp ownership yourself.

  2. Sharing materialisation is no longer skipped — the rough edge is closed, and it is recorded here rather than deleted. This entry used to describe "configured but inert": nine installed sharing rules, matching records, correct positions — and sys_record_share empty, repaired only by a re-evaluation or a restart. The reading that made it a rough edge rather than a defect was that the boot backfill eventually fixes it, so the behaviour was correct and merely undiscoverable; #6783 shipped an INFO notice on that reasoning.

    That reading did not survive contact with a runtime write. An approval node's write-back is a system write — lockRecord: true means only a platform write can land while the record is locked — and it happens long after boot, so no backfill was coming: a manager approved a request and the teammate who depended on the criteria rule status == "approved" could not see it at all. The maintainer ruled on 2026-08-31 (#13533) that the skip was a bug, because a sharing rule's declared semantics is a published promise and isSystem names the operator, never a consequence that need not happen. Both materialisation skips and the notice that announced them are gone; row 31 is now the afterDelete skip alone, which survives on the separate ground that another subscriber delivers that payload.

    ⚠️ The observability half of that reading is worth keeping in mind independently: the only signal a builder ever had was one INFO line, and nothing in the docs or the tests said "after approval, when does the team see it?". A compensating path that exists but that nobody can be expected to know about is not a compensating path.

  3. Strict write observability is inert under elevation. Row 22: a caller that asked to be told loudly about dropped fields is told nothing, because nothing was dropped. The two facts are indistinguishable from the outside.

  4. revoke() skips its own conflict guard. Row 35 is correct for the rule evaluator and surprising for anything else: a system caller can delete a rule-materialised grant that the next reconcile silently restores.

  5. applySystemFields does not read this flag. It is named as if it did. packages/objectql/src/registry.ts#applySystemFields is schema-side column provisioning — which columns an object carries — and consumes ExecutionContext.isSystem zero times. The write-time ownership behaviour people attribute to it is row 2, in plugin-security.


Decision on record: the flag is deliberately not being split

Maintainer ruling, #4707, 2026-08-06. Recorded here at the ruling's own request, so the proposal stops being re-opened.

Ownership injection, readonly bypass and sharing materialisation are independent decisions, and a seed loader plausibly wants the first two but not the third. The concept is nevertheless staying as one boolean:

  • Shipped semantics. isSystem is a published contract read at over a hundred sites across some twenty packages. Splitting it is a breaking contract change across all of them. (The ruling was taken when the census read 80 sites in 18 packages; the count has grown since, which strengthens rather than weakens the argument.)
  • No business pull. No app has asked for the combinations a split would enable; the observed need was to understand the flag, which is what this page serves.
  • Combinatorics are worse for AI authors, not better. Three independent switches are eight states, most of them untested and several of them incoherent (grant materialisation without ownership). One flag plus this table is judged more mistake-proof at authoring time than a surface where a wrong combination is expressible and silently valid.

The trade-off accepted with that ruling is that elevation stays coarse: you cannot ask for the ownership behaviour without also taking the sharing behaviour. Where a narrower need exists, the platform answers it with a separate, explicit option next to isSystem — skipTriggers, preserveAudit, skipStateMachine, runAs — rather than by subdividing the flag. That is the pattern to follow for any new narrow exemption.


Maintaining this table

The table's value is exhaustiveness, so it is built by census, not by recall — and the census is a committed instrument rather than someone's afternoon:

node scripts/isystem-census.mjs          # the live totals, for the tree you run it on
node scripts/isystem-census.mjs --json   # every site, its kind and its package

This page states no totals, and that is deliberate. How many sites, in how many packages and files, is derived data: it moves whenever a read arrives or leaves, and a figure typed into hand-written prose is paid for at every merge. Two branches that each add a read bump the same sentence and conflict on it — or, bumping it to the same number, text-merge clean to a total neither tree holds, which is how this page once went silently wrong (#16919). So the totals are computed where they are read: the census prints them for the tree you run it on, and the check below prints them again on every pass. What CI holds is the list itself — every elevation read owned by a row, every anchor resolving — not a sum of it. Where a read lives is generated; which row describes it is a human's editorial call: name the read's symbol in a row's Symbol cell, or drop the row whose reads are gone.

⛔ Not a grep. A text scan is where a census starts and it cannot be where one ends: it returns prose inside comments and strings, the three unrelated metadata fields, and the isSystemObject / isSystemObjectName / isSystemLedgerObject name helpers. Worse, it loses real sites — a regex pass over this same corpus silently dropped 6 reads in the saved-report service (retired since, #20102) to a quoting desync and 11 more to (ctx?.session as any)?.isSystem casts. So the census walks the TypeScript AST and classifies each appearance of the identifier by where the parser puts it: a read (a table row here), a declaration, an object-literal or type key (a producer, not a behaviour), or something else.

Corpus: tracked .ts / .tsx / .mts / .cts under packages/ and examples/, excluding dist/. A file counts as a test when its path carries .test. / .spec. or a tests/ / __tests__/ / qa/ segment. The census narrows that corpus in the order below. The raw text it starts from is kept here as a dated snapshot:

Raw textCount
Lines carrying isSystem in the corpus1811
— in tests1013
— in non-test sources798
Appearances of the bare identifier isSystem in non-test sources813
— parsed as an object-literal / type key (producers and option objects)310
— the remainder: text inside comments and string literals358

The rest of those appearances are what the census classifies, and the page restates none of its figures:

Census stepWhat it holds
Appearances parsed as a declarationevery declaring slot — see below
Appearances parsed as a property readevery read, before the collision is subtracted
Appearances parsed in some other syntactic positiona local, a cast, a conditional
Of those reads: reads of one of the unrelated metadata fieldssubtracted — the collision this page opens with
Of those reads: reads of ExecutionContext.isSystemthe census answer: every one sits in a symbol a row above names
— behaviour-bearing (rows 1–62 above)sections 1 to 5
— carry the flag onward only (rows 63–66 above)section 6

node scripts/isystem-census.mjs prints how many appearances fell in each syntactic slot, the subtraction, the answer and the packages and files that hold it; node scripts/check-system-context-census.mjs prints the answer again on every pass, with the distinct symbols those reads live in and how many files hold more than one read in one symbol.

The six raw-text rows are a dated decomposition, not a live claim: they were measured on 2026-08-29 at ca1965f2b5 and CI does not re-derive them. They count raw text over the whole corpus — every line, identifier appearance, object-literal key and prose mention of the string isSystem under packages/ and examples/, tests included — which is a different population from the one this page certifies, and it churns for reasons that have nothing to do with elevation: a test that mentions the flag, a seed object carrying isSystem: true, a comment. Enforcing them made this page's own pull request un-landable, because CI scores a merge with main and the merge queue re-derives that merge against a newer main on every attempt: three unrelated merges moved these six numbers eight times in one night, while the census population — 109 sites in 20 packages across 45 files at the time — did not move once. They are kept because they are how far a raw grep sits from the census answer, which is the whole argument of this section; they are unenforced because a count of lines in test files certifies nothing. Re-measure them with node scripts/isystem-census.mjs when you want them current, and move the date.

What the census counts as a declaration. Not only the three field declarations above — those are three distinct fields that happen to share a name, and only the first is elevation. It counts every position where the parser puts the identifier in a declaring slot: those three, plus the structural type literals that restate ExecutionContext.isSystem's shape inline rather than importing it ({ isSystem: true; tenantId?: string }, context?: { isSystem?: boolean }, and the get isSystem() accessor on the engine's context wrapper). A restatement is a producer's declaration of the shape it will build, never a read, so a new one moves the census's declaration count and nothing on this page — the read population and the anchored rows above stay where they are. The most recent arrival is the scoped seed context threaded into the org-admin permission-set lookup in packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/auto-org-admin-grant.ts, so that read is scoped to the granting organization rather than read organization-less (#11670). It reads the legacy sys_permission_set ids an old grant may carry; that object is no longer registered (ADR-0131 D3), so the read answers no rows. ⛔ Cited as a FILE deliberately, with no #symbol: this page's symbol anchors name the enclosing declaration of an elevation read, and a declaration of the shape is not one — so there is no symbol here for a row to name, and inventing one would put a name on the page that no rename could ever red.

Counting by hand is what made the previous edition wrong in two independent ways, so both are worth naming. Its headline said "80 distinct sites across 18 packages" while its own tables anchored 77 — the number never matched the page it described. And a grep -c for anchor-shaped text over the previous edition answered 64, because it counted lines carrying an anchor, not anchors: that page's real anchor population was 111 once continuation anchors and range ends are counted. Decompose a text count before comparing it to anything.

What CI holds, and why it is the population and not just the anchors

A line-number anchor rots on every unrelated edit to the same file, silently: re-resolving all 111 anchors of the edition before last found 101 pointing at a line that no longer held what the row named, while only 10 were still correct — and 41 of them named a basename that matches two files, so they could not be placed without reading the row's Package column. Neither failure is reachable from this edition: it carries no line numbers at all, and it spells every path in full from the repository root. Each anchor is packages/…/file.ts#symbol, resolved by the shared symbol-anchor resolver (scripts/symbol-anchors.mjs) against that file's own declaration sites — the same resolver, and the same registration shape, that holds docs/adr/**. Renaming a symbol is now a loud red instead of a silent misdirection. The rows no longer write those anchors: a row names its symbols, and the site register — generated, so a moved symbol needs no hand edit — writes one anchor per symbol. Only a name two files share is pinned in its row as a full anchor, and moves like one.

⚠️ The precision that costs, priced here rather than buried. A symbol anchor cannot say WHICH read inside a function it means, and several of the anchored files hold more than one read inside a single symbol. So the population check runs per file at symbol granularity: every file the census finds a read in must be anchored, and the set of symbols this page cites into that file must equal the set of symbols the census finds reads in. Two consequences, and the second one is a hole:

  • Delete a whole symbol and this page reds — the anchor stops resolving and the symbol set stops matching, in the same run.
  • Add or delete one of several reads inside a symbol that keeps at least one, and the symbol set does not move — but that symbol's read count in the site register does, so CI reds until the register is regenerated. That is a tripwire in the pull request's diff, not a row requirement: regenerating clears it without touching the row, exactly as the old site total's generator did, so whether the row still describes the symbol is the reviewer's call. The previous edition's line numbers did close this one: both reads lost in the last drift lived inside callerContext() helpers that still exist under the same names. Closing it fully means a span-aware resolver and per-read disambiguation in those files; that is its own card, and it is deliberately not folded in here.

Resolving anchors is nevertheless the second check, not the first. ⭐ A gate that only checks what the page already says can never find what the page failed to say. Re-resolving every anchor of the edition before last would have passed while it was missing 32 sites and its headline was 29 too low. So the load-bearing direction runs census → page: every elevation read in the code must be owned by a row here, and a symbol whose last read vanishes from the code leaves a row key that names no read, which is what makes a row describing a protection that no longer exists fail.

Six checks run, in scripts/check-system-context-census.mjs:

CheckWhat fails
Populationan elevation read in a symbol no row's Symbol cell names — --write refuses to generate over it — or a file holding reads the page does not anchor
Row keysa key naming a symbol no census read lives in any more, a bare name two files share (pin it as path#symbol), or a row with no key that resolves to a read
Registera site register that is not what --write generates from the tree: a read added, deleted or moved, or a key changed, without regenerating
Resolutionan anchor naming no tracked file, or naming a symbol that file does not declare — and any surviving line number, which is no longer an anchor form
Classificationan anchor that is not a read site and is not a declared non-read citation
Dated snapshota raw-text row above reworded off the page, or its measurement date dropped — the numbers themselves are never compared

A new read of ExecutionContext.isSystem belongs in this table in the same PR that introduces it — CI will say so when it lands in a symbol no row names yet; inside a symbol a row already names, the register's read count moves and CI reds until it is regenerated, and only the reviewer can say whether the row still describes it.

Site register

Generated from the tree — never edit it by hand. One line per symbol the census finds an elevation read in: its full anchor, how many reads that symbol holds, and the rows above whose Symbol cell names it. A symbol that moves to another file moves here and nowhere else: node scripts/check-system-context-census.mjs --write rebuilds this register, and CI refuses one that differs from what the tree produces.

AnchorReadsRows
packages/core/src/security/anonymous-deny.ts#shouldDenyAnonymous110
packages/core/src/security/tenant-layer0-verdict.ts#isOutsideEveryOrganization16d
packages/mcp/src/stdio-data-bridge.ts#enforceApiExposure115
packages/mcp/src/tool-call-interceptor.ts#toolCallPrincipalOf266
packages/metadata-core/src/meta-write-capability.ts#metaWriteCapabilityVerdict151
packages/metadata-core/src/meta-write-capability.ts#walledCatalogWriteVerdict155b
packages/metadata-core/src/object-schema-fls.ts#isObjectSchemaMaskExempt18
packages/objectql/src/credential-evaluation-guard.ts#rejectCredentialEvaluation118c
packages/objectql/src/engine-cascade-planning.ts#dependentCountIsDisclosable128
packages/objectql/src/engine-delete-cascade.ts#recordReferenceCheckElevation129
packages/objectql/src/engine-driver-options.ts#buildDriverOptions124
packages/objectql/src/engine-execution-plumbing.ts#buildSession163
packages/objectql/src/engine-insert.ts#insert321, 22
packages/objectql/src/engine-master-detail-related.ts#resolveOneHopRelated129b
packages/objectql/src/engine-referential-integrity.ts#assertReferencesResolve123
packages/objectql/src/engine-referential-integrity.ts#masterDetailHeadersCallerReads129c
packages/objectql/src/engine-referential-integrity.ts#referencesCheckedBeforeRules123
packages/objectql/src/engine-referential-integrity.ts#storedReferencesCallerReads123
packages/objectql/src/engine-scoped-context.ts#appAuthoredHookApi11b
packages/objectql/src/engine-secret-internal-fields.ts#encryptSecretFields123e
packages/objectql/src/engine-secret-internal-fields.ts#stripSearchCompanionFromRead127
packages/objectql/src/engine-update.ts#update419, 20
packages/objectql/src/engine-validate.ts#validate121b
packages/objectql/src/engine.ts#isSystem164
packages/objectql/src/fixed-read-leaf-seam.ts#passFixedReadLeaves118f
packages/objectql/src/internal-field-evaluation-guard.ts#rejectInternalFieldEvaluation118e
packages/objectql/src/recycle-bin/list.ts#assertCallerManagesRecycleBin129f
packages/objectql/src/recycle-bin/purge.ts#recycleBinWallDenies129d
packages/objectql/src/recycle-bin/restore.ts#assertCallerMayRestoreEntry129e
packages/objectql/src/stored-metadata-type-read-gate.ts#storedMetadataTypeReadFilter118d
packages/observability/src/perf-timing.ts#isPerfDisclosurePrincipal113
packages/plugins/organizations/src/organizations-plugin.ts#start162
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/approval-service.ts#assertAttachmentsUploadedByCaller143
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/approval-service.ts#comment143
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/approval-service.ts#isOverrideActor143
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/approval-service.ts#reassign143
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/approval-service.ts#remind143
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/approval-service.ts#requestInfo143
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/approval-service.ts#resolveActor143
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/approval-service.ts#resubmit143
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/approval-service.ts#sendBack143
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/lifecycle-hooks.ts#bindApprovalLockHook141
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/lifecycle-hooks.ts#bindDelegationWriteGuard142
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/lifecycle-hooks.ts#bindDetailRowLockHook141
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/payload-predicate-guard.ts#bindSnapshotPredicateGuard117
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/payload-redaction-middleware.ts#bindSnapshotRedactionMiddleware117
packages/plugins/plugin-approvals/src/reader-locale-labels-middleware.ts#bindReaderLocaleLabelsMiddleware117
packages/plugins/plugin-audit/src/activity-field-redaction.ts#installActivityFieldRedaction145
packages/plugins/plugin-audit/src/activity-read-visibility.ts#installActivityReadVisibility145
packages/plugins/plugin-audit/src/activity-summary-message.ts#installActivitySummaryLocale145
packages/plugins/plugin-audit/src/audit-log-field-redaction.ts#installAuditLogFieldRedaction145
packages/plugins/plugin-audit/src/audit-log-read-visibility.ts#installAuditLogReadVisibility145
packages/plugins/plugin-audit/src/comment-access-hooks.ts#installCommentAccessHooks345
packages/plugins/plugin-audit/src/comment-access-hooks.ts#installCommentReadVisibility145
packages/plugins/plugin-audit/src/parent-field-query-guard.ts#installParentFieldQueryGuard145
packages/plugins/plugin-audit/src/read-audit.ts#installReadAuditWriter116
packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/api-key-restore-guard.ts#isUserContextWrite126b
packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-plugin.ts#start112
packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/identity-write-guard.ts#isUserContextWrite126
packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/owner-fixed-rule.ts#isOwnerChange126c
packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/principal-session-mint.ts#refuseUpFront161b
packages/plugins/plugin-email/src/email-template-door.ts#isOrganizationWrite159
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/agent-account-grant-refusal.ts#onInsert123g
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/agent-account-grant-refusal.ts#onUpdate123g
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/agent-ceiling-grant-refusal.ts#judges123f
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/flow-system-identity-write-refusal.ts#elevationSource11b, 25
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-holder-membership-refusal.ts#onInsert123d
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-holder-membership-refusal.ts#onUpdate123d
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-permission-set-name.ts#onInsert123c
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/grant-permission-set-name.ts#onUpdate123c
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/owner-anchor-stamp.ts#isActionBodyElevation12
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/position-catalog-refusal.ts#assertPositionNamesCatalogRow123b
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin-authz-middleware.ts#registerAuthzMiddleware11, 2, 30
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin-cbp-write-gate.ts#checkControlledByParentWrite19b
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin-explain-access.ts#explainAccessForCaller19
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin-explain-access.ts#mayDescribeAnotherUser19
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin-field-readers.ts#resolveProjectionFieldMask14
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin-object-admission.ts#canExport15
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin-object-admission.ts#canReadObject16
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin-object-admission.ts#canWriteObject16b
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin-read-filter.ts#getReadFilter13
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin-security-service.ts#registerSecurityService37
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin-withheld-field-readers.ts#computeMetadataReadableWithheldFields14
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin-write-tenant-wall.ts#writeWallVerdict16c
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/stored-permission-set-package-stamp.ts#holderLeftToEngine123h
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/stored-permission-set-package-stamp.ts#onUpdate123h
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/stored-permission-set-package-stamp.ts#oneGrantOnUpdate123h
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/suggested-audience-bindings.ts#assertDeploymentAuthority158
packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/system-write-guard.ts#isUserContextWrite125
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/rule-hooks.ts#bindRuleHooks131
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/rule-hooks.ts#bindRuleObjectEnforcementGuard140
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts#createLink338
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts#listLinks138
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/share-link-service.ts#revokeLink138
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-plugin.ts#buildSharingMiddleware137
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-rule-provenance.ts#bindRuleProvenanceStamp139
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-rule-service.ts#assertCanManageRules140
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-rule-service.ts#bindDeclaredRuleNameGuard140
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-rule-service.ts#defineRule140
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts#assertCanManageShares133
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts#bypassVerdict132
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts#canManageShares133
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts#grant234
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts#listShares136
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts#revoke135
packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts#shouldBypass133
packages/plugins/plugin-webhooks/src/declared-webhooks.ts#bindDeclaredWebhookNameGuard159
packages/plugins/plugin-webhooks/src/webhook-provenance.ts#bindWebhookProvenanceStamp159
packages/rest/src/data-action-routes.ts#importUndoWriteContext130c
packages/rest/src/external-datasource-routes.ts#registerExternalDatasourceRoutes252, 55b
packages/rest/src/import-prepare.ts#importControlOptOutRefusal130b
packages/rest/src/meta-collection-routes.ts#registerMetaCollectionRoutes150
packages/rest/src/meta-item-history-routes.ts#registerMetaItemHistoryRoutes250
packages/rest/src/meta-item-write-routes.ts#registerMetaItemWriteRoutes150
packages/rest/src/meta-record-currency-backfill-route.ts#registerMetaRecordCurrencyBackfillRoute150b
packages/rest/src/meta-unit-code-backfill-route.ts#registerMetaUnitCodeBackfillRoute150c
packages/rest/src/package-routes.ts#refusePackageRequest252, 54
packages/rest/src/rest-server.ts#enforceAuth118
packages/rest/src/rest-server.ts#mayReadAuthoringTrail18b
packages/rest/src/rest-server.ts#metaSaveVerdict150
packages/rest/src/rest-server.ts#walledCatalogRefusal155b
packages/runtime/src/action-dispatch.ts#dispatchActionRequest152
packages/runtime/src/action-execution.ts#actionPermissionError149
packages/runtime/src/action-execution.ts#actionSelectionIsRead149
packages/runtime/src/action-execution.ts#callData148
packages/runtime/src/action-execution.ts#refuseUnexposedDataAction148
packages/runtime/src/action-execution.ts#refuseUnreadableFlowStartRecords157
packages/runtime/src/domains/actions.ts#handleActionsRequest152
packages/runtime/src/domains/activation-gate.ts#refuseUngrantedActivationAuthoring156
packages/runtime/src/domains/activation-gate.ts#refuseUngrantedActivationWrite156
packages/runtime/src/domains/ai.ts#handleAIRequest152
packages/runtime/src/domains/analytics.ts#handleAnalyticsRequest152
packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#handleAutomationRequest152
packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#isRunStarterOrRunStateReader157
packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#mayReadRunState157
packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#refuseUngrantedConnectorConnectionAccess157c
packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#refuseUngrantedConnectorCredentialAccess157b
packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#refuseUngrantedFlowWrite157
packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#refuseUngrantedRunLifecycleWrite157
packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#refuseWalledConnectorCredentialAccess157b
packages/runtime/src/domains/automation.ts#refuseWalledFlowDefinitionWrite155b
packages/runtime/src/domains/i18n.ts#handleI18nRequest152
packages/runtime/src/domains/mcp-authoring.ts#openWriter155b
packages/runtime/src/domains/mcp.ts#federationService155b
packages/runtime/src/domains/mcp.ts#handleMcpRequest153
packages/runtime/src/domains/mcp.ts#membershipReachRefusal162b
packages/runtime/src/domains/mcp.ts#resumeActionRunRequest152
packages/runtime/src/domains/meta.ts#handleMetadataRequest550, 52
packages/runtime/src/domains/packages.ts#handlePackagesRequest152
packages/runtime/src/domains/packages.ts#refuseWalledCatalogPackageWrite155b
packages/runtime/src/domains/packages.ts#requireCommitTrailReadCapability18b
packages/runtime/src/domains/packages.ts#requireManageMetadata155
packages/runtime/src/domains/packages.ts#requireReadCapability155
packages/runtime/src/domains/permission-set-clone.ts#handlePermissionSetCloneWrite250
packages/runtime/src/domains/security.ts#handleSecurityRequest152
packages/runtime/src/flow-start-admission.ts#flowStartRefusal157
packages/runtime/src/sandbox/body-doors.ts#callerScopeOf165b
packages/runtime/src/sandbox/body-runner.ts#executionContextFromHook165
packages/services/service-automation/src/runtime-identity.ts#stampSystemInsertOwner160
packages/services/service-knowledge/src/knowledge-service.ts#applyPermissionFilter146
packages/services/service-mailbox/src/ingest/mail-ingest-service.ts#authorizeRematch147b
packages/services/service-mailbox/src/ingest/mail-ingest-service.ts#ingest147b
packages/services/service-mailbox/src/mail-read-visibility.ts#gateMiddleware147
packages/services/service-mailbox/src/sync/mailbox-sync-service.ts#syncAll147c
packages/services/service-mailbox/src/sync/mailbox-sync-service.ts#syncMailbox147c
packages/services/service-messaging/src/inbox-caller.ts#resolveInboxRecipient161
packages/services/service-print/src/print-service.ts#refuseUnlessHumanCaller147d
packages/services/service-settings/src/settings-read-door.ts#settingsReadDoorMiddleware118b
packages/services/service-storage/src/attachment-access-hooks.ts#installAttachmentAccessHooks344
packages/services/service-storage/src/attachment-access-hooks.ts#installAttachmentFileReferenceGate244
packages/services/service-storage/src/attachment-access-hooks.ts#installAttachmentReadVisibility144
packages/services/service-storage/src/file-attachment-service.ts#requireUserContext147e
packages/services/service-storage/src/file-reference-lifecycle.ts#referencingCallerOf147f
packages/services/service-storage/src/record-file-access.ts#requireUserContext147e
packages/services/service-storage/src/sys-file-storage-owned-columns.ts#installSysFileStorageOwnedColumnsGuard147g

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